

Terms of Reference

Purpose

To investigate how, and in what circumstances, 22 innocent people came to lose their lives in the attack at the Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017 and to make any such recommendations as may seem appropriate.

Scope

The inquiry's investigations will include consideration of the following matters:

1. Whether the attack by Salman Abedi could have been prevented by the authorities, including investigation of:

- i. The background of Salman Abedi.
- ii. His radicalisation, including his relationship with relevant associates (including family members and others), and any relevant external sources (e.g. online).
- iii. The knowledge of the Security Service, the police and others about Salman Abedi, his radicalisation, and his relationship with relevant associates, including family members and others.
- iv. What intelligence and other relevant information on Salman Abedi and/or relevant associates was available to the Security Service, the police and others prior to the attack.
- v. When such intelligence/information was available.
- vi. The assessment, interpretation, dissemination and investigation of intelligence/information relating to Salman Abedi, including, if applicable, whether and how it was shared, who it was shared with, when it was shared, and with what effect (if any).
- vii. What steps were (or were not) taken by the Security Service, the police and others in relation to Salman Abedi prior to the attack.
- viii. The reasons for what was/was not done.
- ix. The adequacy of the steps that were (or were not) taken.
- x. The systems, policies and procedures applicable to the review, sharing and actioning of intelligence and other relevant information on Salman Abedi prior to the attack.
- xi. The adequacy of such systems, policies and procedures.

2. The build up to the attack, including:

- i. Attack planning and reconnaissance.
- ii. Bomb preparation and assembly, including, if applicable, relevant purchases/attempted purchases and storage.

- iii. The movements of Salman Abedi and other, relevant associates in the lead up to the attack.
- iv. What, if anything, was known by the Security Service, the police and others about the matters above (planning, preparation, etc), what steps were taken (if any), and their adequacy.

3. The attack itself, including:

- i. Events immediately prior to and following the detonation of the explosive device.
- ii. The immediate impact of the explosive device on the victims of the attack.
- iii. The immediate response to the detonation of the explosive device.

4. The security arrangements within and outside the Arena, including:

- i. The security provided/arranged by the owner and operator of the Arena venue, and those contracted by them to provide security, in particular the City Room's security arrangements.
- ii. The security provided by relevant public/State organisations.
- iii. The security provided by relevant private security providers.
- iv. The planning, preparation, arrangements and communication (if any) between the above security providers prior to the attack, including (but not limited to) their roles and responsibilities for risk identification, person and bag-checking, and responding to a terrorist and/or mass casualty incident.
- v. The adequacy of (a-d) above, including their compliance with relevant planning, preparation, policies, systems and practices.
- vi. The impact, if any, of any inadequacies in the security arrangements, including whether any inadequacies contributed to the extent of the loss of life that occurred.

5. The emergency response to the bombing, including:

- i. Planning and preparation for responding to terrorist and mass casualty incidents, including inter-agency planning, preparation and exercises prior to the attack.
- ii. Policies, systems and practices relevant to the above.
- iii. The operational responses of relevant emergency services, those contracted to provide first aid to concert-goers, the operator of the Arena venue, and relevant security providers, including their adequacy and compliance with relevant planning, preparation, policies, systems and practices.
- iv. The inter-agency liaison, communication and decision-making between relevant emergency services, and with others, including their adequacy and compliance with relevant planning, preparation, policies, systems and practices.
- v. The impact, if any, of any inadequacies in planning, preparation and/or the emergency response, including whether any inadequacies

undermined the ability of the response to save life and/or contributed to the extent of the loss of life that occurred.

6. The experiences of each person who died, including:

- i. Their travel to the Arena.
- ii. The locations they visited.
- iii. Who they were with.
- iv. Their movements at/around the Arena.

7. The immediate cause and mechanism of each death, including:

- i. The mechanism and cause of death.
- ii. Exactly when and where each person died (to the extent that this is possible to ascertain).
- iii. Survivability, including whether any inadequacies in the emergency response contributed to individual deaths and/or whether any of the deaths could have been prevented.

Method

The inquiry will examine and review all documents as the inquiry chairman shall judge appropriate.

The inquiry will receive such oral and written evidence as the inquiry chairman shall judge appropriate.

Reporting

The inquiry will report to the Home Secretary as soon as practicable. The report will make any such recommendations as may seem appropriate.

Given the sensitive nature of the material, the inquiry chairman may choose to produce both an OPEN and a CLOSED report.