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The Manchester Arena Inquiry has now concluded. The closure notice from the Inquiry Chairman is available here.

Volume 1: Security for the Arena
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  2. Volume 1: Security for the Arena
  3. Part 4: The Counter Terrorism Security Advisor system

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Volume 1: Security for the Arena
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Part 4: The Counter Terrorism Security Advisor system

Key findings

  • The voluntary nature of the CTSA system and the lack of any specific duty to identify and mitigate the risk of terrorism means that system is inadequate to provide a proper level of protection to the public.
  • The CTSA did not consider and advise on what security was required to protect against an attack by a person-borne IED in the City Room, particularly during egress or ingress. There was nothing about that issue on the Protective Security Improvement Activity form to bring that particular area at those particular times into focus.
  • The way the CTSA spoke to SMG about the Protective Security Improvement Activity scores could have led to a false level of reassurance being provided to SMG.
  • BTP and GMP CTSAs should have co-operated and had regular communication in relation to their respective processes within the Victoria Exchange Complex.
  • The CTSA culture at the time meant that organisations in Showsec’s position were not invited to participate in the CTSA process. Security at the Arena would have benefitted from Showsec’s involvement in that process.