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The Manchester Arena Inquiry has now concluded. The closure notice from the Inquiry Chairman is available here.

Volume Three: Radicalisation and Preventability
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  2. Volume Three: Radicalisation and Preventability
  3. Appendicies
  4. Appendix 20: Rulings in relation to the closed material and hearings
  5. Appendix 1

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Appendix 1

(questions in black should be answered by both Witness J and T/ACC Scally; questions in red should be answered by Witness J and questions in blue should be answered by T/ACC Scally)

Didsbury Mosque

    1. When did the engagement with Didsbury Mosque referred to in paragraph 38 of the gist occur?

    2. In what way was the response of Didsbury Mosque less positive than that of the other mosques?

Prevent Referral

    1. Evidence was given in open by both MI5 and CTP that Salman Abedi was never considered for a Prevent referral. This is contradicted by paragraph 41 of the gist. Assuming the gist to be correct, (a) was this consideration given by MI5 or CTP or both and (b) what is the explanation for the erroneous evidence of MI5 and CTP?

“De Facto” Subject of Interest

    1. Who treated Salman Abedi as a “De Facto” Tier 2 Subject of Interest?

    2. Between September 2015 and August 2016, were those treating Salman Abedi as a “De Facto” Tier 2 Subject of Interest aware that a Schedule 7 ports examination of Ishmale Abedi on 3rd September 2015 had produced material indicating that Ishmale Abedi sympathised with Islamic State?

Subjects of Interest

    1. Has the total number of Subjects of Interest with whom Salman Abedi had contact been disclosed in open together with their classification, eg. direct or second level?

Systems for Communicating

    1. When was it realised by anyone with a supervisory or managerial role at MI5 that the systems for communicating between MI5 and CTP had shortcomings described in the gist?

    2. When was anything done by MI5 to address those shortcomings?

    3. When was it realised by anyone with a supervisory or managerial role at CTP that the systems for communicating between MI5 and CTP had shortcomings described in the gist?

    4. When was anything done by CTP to address those shortcomings?

Written Policy

    1. When was the written policy referred to in paragraph 25 of the gist implemented?

    2. Is it the view of MI5 that its implementation has improved the aspect of the partnership between MI5 and CTP to which it relates?

    3. Is it the view of CTP that its implementation has improved the aspect of the partnership between MI5 and CTP to which it relates?

Libya

  1. When did Libya become one of the top four priorities for CTP?

  2. Was Libya also a top for priority for MI5 and, if so, when did it become so?