In Part 10, I set out key events on the night of the Attack in a broadly chronological order. I identified a number of failings that occurred during the critical period of the response, by which I mean the period from the explosion at 22:31 to the removal of the final living casualty from the City Room at 23:39. In this Part, I will look at each of the police services in turn: British Transport Police (BTP) and Greater Manchester Police (GMP).
The final section of this Part looks at the response of the Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (CTPHQ). CTPHQ had an important role on the night of 22nd May 2017 and in the aftermath of the Attack. Inevitably, because CTPHQ was based in London, its contribution was minimal during the critical period of the response.
So far as is possible, each section is structured chronologically. Together, they are not an exhaustive rehearsal of everything that was or was not done by the police services. I have focused on the commanders, other decision‑makers and key personnel. This is with a view to drawing out further detail around the failings I identified in Parts 10, 11 and 12.